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INTRODUCTION

Among mainstream religious and secular political groups, the
Roman Catholic Church takes one of the firmest positions on protecting
human life. Responding to what Pope John Paul II called the global

"culture of death" that has developed since the mid-20th century,' the
* Yale Law School, J.D.; Emory University, B.A. Many thanks to Stephen L. Carter,
for feedback on this Article at various stages from its inception. Thanks also to Nicole
Taykhman, for assistance in editing. Finally, my gratitude goes to Jane S. Jiang, for the
numerous conversations that inspired ideas incorporated into this Article, as well as for her
encouragement in general. All opinions and mistakes herein are my own.
1. In his famous cyclical Evangelium Vitae ("The Gospel of Life"), Pope John Paul II
described the "culture of death" as
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Church's Canon Law and Catechism state that issues such as abortion,
euthanasia, capital punishment, and war demand a consistent
application of moral principles valuing the sanctity of each and every
human life, above all other considerations. 2 These principles forbid the
intentional ending of lives, especially of innocent people, in all but the
most limited circumstances. Influential American Cardinal Joseph
Bernardin
4 notably dubbed the Church's position as a "consistent ethic
life."
of
Modem just war theory, which effectively originated in the Church
with St. Augustine and St. Thomas of Aquinas, is one embodiment of
the Church's broader consistent life ethic. Like its positions on abortion,
euthanasia, and capital punishment, the Church firmly curbs the5
circumstances in which people can morally engage in this activity.
Beyond discussing principles exclusive to the unique circumstance of
war, often the Church has explicitly connected its ethical positions on
war with its position on other issues where life's sanctity is also at
stake. Beyond the Church's formal Canon Law and Catechism, one of
the most notable examples is the famous 1983 pastoral letter on war and6
peace authored by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB).
In the midst of making significant attempts to steer the Church's
position against nuclear weapons, this statement deftly connected war to

a war of the powerful against the weak: a life which would require greater
acceptance, love and care is considered useless, or held to be an intolerable
burden, and is therefore rejected in one way or another. A person who, because
of illness, handicap or, more simply, just by existing, compromises the wellbeing or life-style of those who are more favoured tends to be looked upon as
an enemy to be resisted or eliminated. In this way a kind of "conspiracy against
life" is unleashed.
12, available at
John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, CATHOLIC-PAGES.COM (Mar. 25, 1995),
http://www.catholic-pages.com/documents/evangeliumvitae.pdf.
2. See Catechism of the Catholic Church, STGABRIELPARISH.CA (2d ed.) pt. 3, § 2, ch. 2,
art. 5, available at http://stgabrielparish.ca/gallery.2/documents/ [hereinafter Catechism]. See
infra Part I for discussion.
3. See id.
4. Cardinal Joseph Bernardin, A Consistent Life Ethic: An American-Catholic Dialogue,
PRIESTS FOR LIFE (Dec. 6, 1983), available at http://www.priestsforlife.org/magisterium/
bemardingannon.html; see also Sidney Callahan, The Consistent Life Ethic, 2 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 272 (2005); John L. Carr, The Consistent Life Ethic: A Look Back, A Look Around, A Look
Ahead, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 256 (2005) (exploring the history of this ethic); J. Stephen
Cleghom, Respect for Life: Research Notes on CardinalBernadin's "Seamless Garment," 28
REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 129, 138-39 (1986); Susan Frelich Appleton, Unraveling the "Seamless
Garment ": Loose Threads in Pro-Life Progressivism,2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 294 (2005); John H.
Garvey & Amy V. Coney, CatholicJudges in CapitalCases, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1998).
5. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
6. U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD'S PROMISE
AND OUR RESPONSE (19th ed. 2000) [hereinafter USCCB].
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the Church's anti-abortion stance, distinguishing unintended
loss of
7
innocent life during war from intended killing of a fetus.
Despite the Church's own attempts to connect its position on war to
other issues, outside scholarship on the Church's just war doctrine,
whether praising or criticizing this doctrine, has done little to analyze it
within the context of the Church's broader consistent life ethic.
Similarly, analysis of the Church's position on issues like abortion has
done little to connect these issues systematically to just war theory, even
as scholarship has often compared the Church's positions on abortion,
euthanasia, and capital punishment.8 Such analysis is especially
important in light of the fact that, as the Church itself concedes, just war
principles like "proportionality" and "discrimination," though definite
in theory, are difficult to apply in practice. 9 Consequently, existing
scholarship misses the potential for the Church's broader life ethic to
inform somewhat nebulous just war principles.
Even more importantly, this scholarship has failed to appreciate that,
within the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and particularly since the
advent of global terrorism and emerging military technologies, the
Church's liberal application of just war theory has potentially threatened
the harmony between just war doctrine and its broader life ethic-an
ethic that has become more restrictive despite a similar emergence of
technologies that arguably improve bioethical and other life-and-death
decisions outside the warfare context. In particular, the Church has
arguably sanctioned many military actions that, though technically
adhering to just war principles, contravene principles found in its
doctrine on other issues where life is at stake. Beyond any implications
these inconsistencies might have for the Church specifically, they
highlight a much broader sociopolitical and legal tension between an
enduringly popular theory of international warfare and the strictures
placed on the human right to life in non-warfare contexts.
7.

Id.

285-89. The pastoral letter states that

even justifiable defense against aggression may result in the indirect or
unintended loss of innocent human lives. This is tragic, but may conceivably be
proportionate to the values defended. Nothing, however, can justify direct
attack on innocent human life, in or out of warfare. Abortion is precisely such
an attack.
Id.

286.

8. One exception is a piece by Mary C. Segers, which notes the "inconsistency gap"
between the USCCB's qualified position on nuclear deterrence versus its unqualified rejection
of abortion as morally impermissible. Mary C. Segers, The CatholicBishops'PastoralLetter on
War and Peace: A Feminist Perspective, II FEMINIST STUD. 619 (1985). See supra note 2 and

accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., USCCB, supra note 6,

98, 184 (conceding that concepts such as these are

"difficult criterion to apply").
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Recognizing this gap in the literature, this Article will argue that the
Church's actual application of just war doctrine has indeed contravened
its broader, otherwise extremely robust ethic of life. This Article makes
this argument by proceeding in three parts. Part I introduces the
Church's doctrine on life, as expressed most explicitly in its Canon Law
on Sanctions and its Catechism on the Fifth Commandment ("Thou
shalt not kill"). Part II explores three specific areas in which the
Church's application of just war doctrine clashes with principles located
in its broader life ethic. Finally, Part III discusses the implications of
these inconsistencies for the Church's future development of its just war
doctrine and its broader life ethic, with an eye toward how to harmonize
the two. It recognizes that the Church is all but certain to continue
adhering broadly to its positions on certain issues like abortion.
Nevertheless, there remain ways for these positions and applications of
just war theory to converge. Doing so, the Church can better legitimize
its seemingly over-formalistic principles.
I. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH'S POSITION ON LIFE
The most basic expression of the Church's position on life, including
on just war doctrine, is located in its Code of Canon Law on Sanctions,
which enumerates punishment for infractions of the Canon.' 0 As Canon
1397 states, "A person who commits a homicide or who kidnaps,
detains, mutilates, or gravely wounds a person by force or fraud is to be
punished."" The Code defines exceptions to this provision, of which
Canon 1323 is most salient: excepted from punishment for violation of
1397 is "a person who acted within the limits of due moderation against
an unjust aggressor for the sake of legitimate self-defense or defense of
another."' 12 How the Church interprets this Provision forms the crux of
its doctrine on just war and other life issues.
The Catechism of the Catholic Church, in its article on the Fifth
Commandment, provides more content to the Canon and encapsulates
the Church's broad position on life. 14 From its very first line, this
Article strongly stresses the sacredness of life:
Human life is sacred because from its beginning it involves the
creative action of God and it remains forever in a special
relationship with the Creator, who is its sole end. God alone is the
10. 1983 CODE cc.1311-99.
11. Id. c. 1397.
12. Id. c. 1323.
13. One other Canon is worth mentioning here: Canon 1398, which states that "[a] person
who actually procures an abortion incurs a latae sententiaeexcommunication." Id. c. 1398.
14. See Catechism, supra note 2.
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Lord of life from its beginning until its end: no one can under any
circumstance claim for himself the right directly to destroy an
innocent human being.15
The principle of the inviolability of life informs the Church's
position with respect to specific issues such as war, homicide, torture,
abortions and sterilizations, capital punishment, and even organ
transplantation, all of which are addressed in the article on the Fifth
Commandment.16 At the same time, the Church recognizes moral
distinctions between these different issues, allowing for life-taking more
permissively in some circumstances than in others. With this in mind,
this Part illuminates the Church's position on four of these issues in
particular: abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, and war. It explores
the principles that exemplify how the Church unifies its positions under
a consistent life ethic. At the same time, it explores the principles that
show how the Church makes subtle ethical distinctions between various
circumstances where life is at stake.
A. Abortion and Euthanasia
Flowing from its declaration that life is inviolable "from its
beginning until its end" and that intentionally taking innocent life is
absolutely impermissible, the Church assumes a rigid stance on abortion
and euthanasia. 17 Addressing abortion specifically, the Catechism states:
"Human life must be respected and protected absolutely from the
moment of conception. From the first moment of his existence, a human
being must be recognized as having the rights of a person-among
which is the inviolable right of every innocent being to life."' 8
The Church's position on abortion tracks the principles of St.
Thomas of Aquinas's double-effect doctrine, which distinguishes
between intended good effects of an action and unintended but foreseen
evil effects of the same action.' 9 An action that has both types of effects
may be licit if it meets four principles:
The immediate action itself must be good or indifferent. It must
not be intrinsically evil.
The foreseen evil effect itself must not be intended.

15.
16.
17.

See id. 2258.
See id. passim.
Id.

18.

Id. 2270 (citation omitted).

19.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIa-IIae Q. 64, art. 7 [hereinafter Summa].
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The intended good effect must not be an effect of the evil, but
produced directly by the immediate action.
The intended good20 effect must be commensurate with the
foreseen evil effect.
With respect to the first criterion, the Catechism states: "Since the
first century the Church has affirmed the moral evil of every procured
2
abortion. This teaching has not changed and remains unchangeable." '
Pope John Paul II's historic encyclical Evangelium Vitae ("The Gospel
of Life"), which describes in greater depth the history of the Church's
"unchanged and unchangeable" position, states further:
The moral gravity of procured abortion is apparent in all its truth
if we recognize that we are dealing with murder and, in
particular, when we consider the specific elements involved. The
one eliminated is a human being at the very beginning of life. No
one more absolutely innocent could be imagined. In no way
could this human being ever be considered an aggressor, much
less an unjust aggressor.... 22
"This doctrine is based upon the natural law and upon the written
Word of God"-and "[n]o circumstance, no purpose, no law whatsoever
can ever make licit an act which is intrinsically illicit, since it is
contrary to the Law of God which is written in every human heart,
knowable by reason itself, and proclaimed by the Church., 23 Even if
one is not personally confident that a fetus is a human being, the Church
argues:
[W]hat is at stake is so important that, from the standpoint of
moral obligation, the mere probability that a human person is
involved would suffice to justify an absolutely clear prohibition
of any intervention aimed at killing a human embryo. Precisely
for this reason, over and above all scientific debates and those
philosophical affirmations to which the Magisterium has not
expressly committed itself, the Church has always taught and
continues to teach that the result of human procreation, from the
first moment of its existence, must be guaranteed that
unconditional respect which is morally due to the human being in
20. T.A. CAVANAUGH, DOUBLE-EFFECT REASONING: DOING GOOD AND AVOIDING EVIL 26
(Oliver O'Donovan ed., 2006).
21. Catechism, supra note 2, 2271.
22. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 1, 58.

23.

ld. 62.
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24
his or her totality and unity as body and spirit.

With respect to the other double-effect criteria, the Church
acknowledges the difficulties faced by women contemplating abortion.
However, it ultimately argues that "[d]irect abortion, that is to say,
abortion willed either as an end or a means, is gravely contrary to the
moral law." 2 5 Abortion cannot be intended as the end in itself (the
second criterion), nor as a means toward another end (the third
criterion), such as a mother's desire "to protect certain important values
such as her own health or a decent standard of living for the other
members of the family" or to ensure a good quality of life for the yetunborn baby itself.26 As the Evangelium Vitae states, "these reasons and
others like them, however, serious and tragic, can never justify the
deliberate killing of an innocent human being." 27 Thus, abortion also
can never meet the fourth criterion.
At the other end of the lifespan, the Church rejects euthanasia and
assisted suicide for very similar reasons. This longstanding stance
begins from the proposition that suicide itself is a "gravely evil choice,"
one that "so radically contradicts the innate inclination to life" and
"represents a rejection of God's absolute sovereignty over life and
death. 2 8 Thus, euthanasia and assisted suicide themselves are gravely
immoral acts (the first criterion). 29 Furthermore, "an act or omission
which, of itself or by intention, causes death in order to eliminate
suffering constitutes a murder gravely contrary to the dignity of the
human person and to the respect due to the living God" (the second and
third criteria). 30 "What really happens in this case is that the individual
is overcome and crushed by a death deprived of any prospect of
meaning or hope.",3 'As the Church states:
Even when not motivated by a selfish refusal to be burdened with
the life of someone who is suffering, euthanasia must be called a
false mercy, and indeed a disturbing "perversion" of mercy. True
"compassion" leads to sharing another's pain; it does not kill the
person whose suffering we cannot bear [the fourth criterion, as
well as the first again].

24.

Id. 60 (emphasis added).

25.
26.
27.

Catechism, supra note 2, 2271 (emphasis added).
Evangelium Vitae, supra note 1, 58.
Id.

28.

Id. 66.

29.
30.
31.

See Catechism, supra note 2,
2270-83.
Id. 2277.
Evangelium Vitae, supra note 1, 15.

32.

Id. 66.
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B. CapitalPunishment
The Catechism of the Church also takes a strong stance against
capital punishment. However, this position differs from abortion and
euthanasia in one crucial respect: it does not consider capital
punishment an intrinsically evil act. "Assuming that the guilty party's
identity and responsibility have been fully determined, the traditional
teaching of the Church does not exclude recourse to the death penalty, if
this is the only possible way of effectively defending human lives
against the unjust aggressor.",3 3 The Catechism justifies the immediate
action of self-defense as such:
Love toward oneself remains a fundamental principle of morality.
Therefore, it is legitimate to insist on respect for one's own right
to life ....Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the
act of moderate self-defense to avoid killing the other man, since
one is bound
to take more care of one's own life than of
34
another's.

The Catechism further states that "[legitimate defence can be not
only a right but a grave duty for someone responsible for another's
life.",35 It is notable that these propositions remain true even "though
[the aggressor himself] may not be morally responsible because of a
lack of the use of reason." 36 Thus, because capital punishment has the
potential purpose of self-defense, it is not an intrinsically evil act.
Nevertheless, over the course of its history and particularly since the
mid-twentieth century, 37 the Church has come to restrict severely when
capital punishment may be used even for this purpose. As the
Catechism states, "[If] non-lethal means are sufficient to defend and
protect people's safety from the aggressor, [then] authority will limit
itself to such means." 38 "Today, in fact, as a consequence of the
possibilities which the state has for effectively preventing crime ... the
cases in which the execution of the offender is an absolute necessity are
very rare, ifnot practically nonexistent.''39 Should any circumstance
exist where capital punishment is proportionate and necessary, it could
33.

Catechism, supra note 2,

1

2267.

34. Id. 2264. As the Evangelium Vitae confirms, "the intrinsic value of life and the duty
to love oneself no less than others are the basis of a true right to self-defense." Evangelium
Vitae, supra note 1, 55.
35.

Catechism, supra note 2,

2265.

36. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 1, 55.
37. See, e.g., E. CHRISTIAN BRUGGER, CAPITAL

PUNISHMENT AND ROMAN CATHOLIC

MORAL TRADITION (2003).

38. Catechism, supra note 2,
39. Id. (emphasis added).

2267.
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meet the other criteria of double-effect beyond being an intrinsically
good or neutral action. The preservation of life, not the killing of the
aggressor would be the intended good (second criterion), and that good
would be produced by the immediate action, not any evil effect of that
action (third criterion).
However, in current practice, such
circumstances may be few.
C. Just War
Developed by Catholic theologians St. Augustine and St. Thomas of
Aquinas, traditional just war theory continues to form the backbone of
the Church's Catechism on war. The Catechism lays out "strict
conditions for legitimate defense by military force,"4 ' conditions that
perfectly track thejus ad bellum principles ofjust war doctrine:
The damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or
community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain. [just
cause]
All other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to
be impractical or ineffective. [last resort]
There must be serious prospects of success. [probability of
success]
The use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than
the evil to be eliminated. The power of modem means of
destruction weighs ver% heavily in evaluating this condition.
[macro-proportionality]
Although not explicitly within its Catechism, the Church has also
adopted thejus in bello principles of just war doctrine in other writings.
In particular, Church doctrine requires that any given military action
intentionally target only combatants (discrimination) and are waged
only if foreseen non-combatant injuries do not clearly exceed the
anticipated military advantage (micro-proportionality).43
These principles are similar to those the Church has adopted in other
areas of its life ethic. Just cause dovetails with the idea that, as with
capital punishment, the legitimate self-defense rationale saves war from
being an intrinsically evil action that violates the first criterion of
40.

See Summa, supra note 19, Q. 64, art. 7.

41.

Id.

42.
43.

Catechism, supra note 2, 2309.
See, e.g., USCCB, supra note 6.
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double-effect. 44 in fact, similar to capital punishment, the Church states
that self-defense in the context of war is not only a right, but a duty, one
that includes a "duty to impose on citizens the obligations necessary for
national defense. ' 4 5 Proportionality, both in thejus ad bellum andjus in
bello sense, complements the proportionality prong of the double-effect
doctrine, as do last resort and probability of success. 46 Finally,
discrimination complements the prohibition of the intentional killing of
innocent people either as a means or ends, as seen in applications of the
remaining prongs of double-effect to abortion and euthanasia.47
Despite parallels between the Church's just war principles and
principles within other parts of its life ethic, a stark difference remains:
unlike with abortion, euthanasia, and even capital punishment, the
Church has a long history of condoning rather than condemning war.
While morally permissible instances of even capital punishment (and
certainly abortion and euthanasia) are "practically non-existent, 4 8 the
Church has continued to sanction multiple wars even into the late
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 49 On the one hand, this stark
difference does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the Church's
just war doctrine is inconsistent with its broader life ethic. There may be
subtle distinctions between the different types of actions that justify
variations in ethical positions. On the other hand, beyond the greater
leeway that the Church's written doctrine gives to war, the Church itself
has conceded that there is significant difficulty in interpreting this
doctrine in real practice. 50 The question thus arises: in actually applying
its doctrine on just war, has the Church potentially contravened its
broader life ethic, as exemplified by its stricter stances on other actions
where lives are at stake?
II. CHURCH-BACKED WARS: INCONSISTENCIES WITH THE CHURCH'S
BROADER LIFE ETHIC

Having laid out the Church's doctrine, this Part explores the tensions
between the Church's application of just war theory and its broader life
ethic. It focuses on the Church's application of specific just war
principles-just cause, proportionality and last resort, and
discrimination-and examines how this application is inconsistent with
the various principles laid out by the double-effect doctrine.
44.

See supra text accompanying note 33.

45.

Catechism, supra note 2,

46.

See supra note 20 and accompanying text.

2310 (emphasis added).

47.

See id.

48.

See supra text accompanying note 39.

49.

See infra Part 11.

50.

See supra text accompanying note 9.
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A. Applications ofJust Cause Versus Doctrine on Intrinsically

Good/Evil Acts
The first tension between applications of the Church's just war
doctrine and its broader life ethic is the Church's expansive recognition
of just cause, which, as this section establishes, has sanctioned military
action even when aggression has not placed lives physically at stake.
The Church recognizes a right and even a duty of self-defense. 5 1 Based
upon the argument that self-love is a fundamental principle of morality,
this right and duty entails that self-defense, including waging war for
52
this purpose, is not an intrinsically evil action in the immediate sense.
In comparison, the Church considers abortion and euthanasia as
intrinsically evil actions. It explicitly rejects the argument that maternal
health and, notably, quality of life and suffering could make
abortion/euthanasia intrinsically good or even neutral actions.5 3
According to the Church, the sanctity and priceless value of life is
inviolate, regardless of variations in actual quality of life. Again, "[n]o
circumstance, no purpose, no54law whatsoever can ever make licit an act
which is intrinsically illicit."
Analyzing these doctrines in aggregate, it seems clear that war in the
name of self-defense must be waged only if actual, physical life-and
not a particular quality or way of life-is at stake. Unless they
themselves are engaging in grave practices that contravene the sanctity
of life (e.g., genocide), in turn negating their right to self-defense,
sovereignties need not justify self-defense on the basis that they have a
51.
52.
1993),

See supra text accompanying note 35.
See supra text accompanying notes 34-35; John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor (Aug. 6,
80, available at http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/

documents/hfjp-ii enc 06081993_veritatis-splendoren.html (describing intrinsically evil
actions as those that "per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always
seriously wrong by reason of their object").
53. See supra text accompanying note 32.
54.

Evangelium Vitae, supra note 1, 62. The Vatican has also stated:

The first right of the human person is his life. He has other goods and some are
more precious, but this one is fundamental - the condition of all the others.
Hence it must be protected above all others. It does not belong to society, nor
does it belong to public authority in any form to recognize this right for some
and not for others: all discrimination is evil, whether it be founded on race, sex,
color or religion. It is not recognition by another that constitutes this right. This
right is antecedent to its recognition; it demands recognition and it is strictly
unjust to refuse it.
John Paul I, Declaration on Procured Abortion (Nov. 18, 1974),
11, available at
http://www.vatican.va/roman curia/congregateons/cfaith/documents/rc con cfaith doc_19741
118_declaration-abortion en.html.

55. See Catechism, supra note 2,
lasting, grave, and certain").

2309 ("damage inflicted by the aggressor ...must be
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morally "good" way of life socially, economically, politically, or even
spiritually speaking. To require such a justification, or similarly to allow
one nation to wage war out of concern for the other nation's quality of
life, would contravene the principles of intrinsic good/evil so robustly
established in the Church's doctrine on abortion and euthanasia. For the
purposes of establishing just cause, it is both sufficient and necessary
that another sovereignty engaged offensively in aggression that
threatens the lives of the aggrieved nation.
Despite these principles, the Church has deemed causes as "just"
throughout the twentieth century, even when arguably only a particular
quality or way of life was at stake. The Church has particularly
sanctioned numerous wars against communist entities, as motivated
predominantly by the anti-religionism of communism rather than any
physical threat. 5 The most noteworthy of such conflicts is the Spanish
57
Civil War, which pitted Franco's Nationalists against Republicans.
The war arose in the context of the rise of anti-clerical laws supported
by Republicans. These laws nationalized Church properties, heavily
restricted Catholic schools and teachers, and banned public
manifestations of Catholicism.5 8 The measures against Catholic
education particularly antagonized the Church, education being an area
that, as Pope Pius XI's 1929 encyclical declared, "belongs preeminently
to the Church" in order that it may teach "moral truth. 59
It is telling that, when full-fledged war broke out in 1936 after a
series of tit-for-tat assassinations between both sides, the Church did
not advocate for peace between the two. Instead, among the Spanish
Catholic Church, it actively and materially supported the pro-Catholic
Nationalists, "mobilizing the mass of peasants and the middle classes
and channelinA them into professional and political right wing
organisations."
According to the Benedictine writer Father Hilari
Raguer:
Nearly the entire hierarchy of the Spanish Church, and nearly all
the prominent among the laity, not only did nothing to restrain
56. "The Church has rejected the totalitarian and atheistic ideologies associated in
modem times with 'communism' or 'socialism."' See id. pt. 3, § 2, ch. 2, art. 7, 2425 (under

doctrine of the Seventh Commandment, "You shall not steal").
57. See ANTONY BEEVOR, THE BATTLE FOR SPAIN: THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 1936-1939
(2d ed. 2006).
58.

See MARY VINCENT, CATHOLICISM IN THE SECOND SPANISH REPUBLIC: RELIGION AND

POLITICS IN SALAMANCA, 1930-1936, at 121 (1996).
59. Pius Xl, Divini Illius Magistri (Dec. 31, 1929), available at http://www.vatican.va/
holyfather/pius-xi/encyclicals/documents/hf p-xi enc 31121929_divini-illius-magistrien.
html.
60. See BEEVOR, supra note 57.
61. VICTOR M. PEREz-DIAZ, THE RETURN OF CIVIL SOCIETY: THE EMERGENCE OF
DEMOCRATIC SPAIN 128 (1993).
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the conflict but spurred it on by joining almost en bloc one of the
two sides, the side that ended by being 62the victor, and by
demonizing whoever was working for peace.
The Spanish Bishops even issued a joint pastoral letter on July 1,
1937, defending Franco's fascists against the communist movement,
arguing that "the Communist Revolution ... was, above all, anti-divine.

So the cycle of secularist legislation of the Constitution of 1931 closed
with the destruction of all that was connected with God., 63 As scholar
Mary Vincent has argued, through this particular action, the "Church
was to become the most importance source of legitimation for the
rebellious generals, justifying the rising
as a crusade against
64
communism.
and
anarchy,
godlessness,
In sanctioning war where there was no one clear aggressor, the
Church circumvented its own principles for ascertaining a just cause.
On the one hand, the Church was undoubtedly a victim under the preCivil War Republican regime and its severe anti-clerical laws. During
the war, one cannot deny the massacre and execution of many clergy,
particularly (though not exclusively) those who backed the
Republicans. Furthermore, under Pope Pius XI, the Vatican itself did
not act in a way that could clearly be interpreted as intending to support
Franco's military actions.
On the other hand, it is clear that the Spanish Catholic Church's
support of Franco's Nationalists-as opposed to any call for peace
delivered to both sides, neither of whom could claim to be the sole
aggrieved party at any point during the conflict-was motivated not for
the purposes of self-defense in the physical sense. Instead, this support
must be attributed to the Church's desire to defend religious freedom,
and more particularly the Church's place in Spanish civil society. One
of Pope Pius's few public communications on the war reinforced this
desire, even if unintentionally: he simultaneously expressed a desire for
a peaceful end to the conflict and condemned communism, the latter
action fueling Franco propaganda. 66 Though protecting religious
freedom is universally important, this principle falls outside the
boundaries ofjust cause when considering the Church's doctrine against
62. HILARI RAGUER, GUNPOWDER AND INCENSE: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE
SPANISH CIVIL WAR 209 (2001).
63. Catholic Bishops of Spain, Joint Letter of the Spanish Bishops to the Bishops of the
Whole Word (July 1, 1937); see also Letter from Enrique Play Deniel, Bishop of Salamanca,
The Two Cities (Sept. 30, 1936) (claiming that Aquinas's conditions for a just war had been met
because the conflict was a crusade to reestablish civil order, hierarchical government, and
Christian civilization).
64. See VINCENT, supra note 58, at 248.
65. See supra text accompanying note 60.
66. RAGUER, supra note 62, at 82.
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killing for the sake of particular quality or way of life.
Even into the twenty-first century, the Church has continued to
highlight its role as victims in the war. In 1971, the Spanish Church fell
short of a sufficient vote among its clergy to accept formally a statement
that would "humbly recognize and ask pardon that [they] did not know
how, when it was necessary, to be true ministers of reconciliation in the
midst of our people tom by a fratricidal war." 67 In more recent years,
both Pope John Paul II and Benedict XVI together have beatified
hundreds, but not all executed clergy during the war, inciting criticism
that they did not beatify clergy who were in opposition to Franco's
Nationalists. 6 8 In response to such criticism, the Vatican has argued that
the beatifications were not about taking sides, but about recognizing
those who died for their religious beliefs. 69 Nevertheless, the continuum
of history of the Spanish Church and the Vatican's actions alike create a
strong inference that the Church did, and continues, to see the Spanish
Civil War as a just defense of ideology and religion.
Several subsequent examples exist where one could reasonably
accuse the Church of supporting military action-and, in some cases,
failing to support military action-for ideological, rather than physical
defense purposes. For example, after the Japanese had infamously
staged the so-called Manchurian Incident to give them a pretext for
invading China in 193 1,70 the Church not only ignored diplomatic pleas
from the Chinese to speak out against the unjust aggression, but also
publicly recognized the state that Japan had established in the occupied
area of China. 7' Indeed, both Pope Pius XI and his successor Pius XII
consistently reaffirmed their support of the newly established Japanese
state, and one Archbishop Zannini even sent a pastoral letter directly to
72
Chinese Catholics asking them to be neutral on the invasion.
Unsurprisingly, some scholars have attributed the Vatican's response to
given the Communist Party's rapid
their anti-communist ideology,
7
growth in China at this time.
The Church, and particularly the USCCB, also supported the anti74
communist cause of the American presence in the Vietnam War.
67. FRANCES LANNON, PRIVILEGE, PERSECUTION AND PROPHECY 114 (1987).
68. See A Complete Listing of the 498 Spanish Martyrs Beatified by Pope Benedict XVI
October 2007, available at http://www.conferenciaepiscopal.es/index.php/conferencia-

episcopal-espanola/secretaria-general/oficina-causa-santos.html.
69. See Vatican Beatifies 498 Spanish Civil War Victims, ABC NEWS AUSTRALIA, Oct.
29, 2007, available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2007-10-28/vatican-beatifies-498-spanish-

civil-war-victims/2589528.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
encyclical

YAN KEJIA, CATHOLIC CHURCH IN CHINA 86-89 (2004).
See id.
See id.
See id.
The Vatican remained relatively silent on the issue. In 1965, Pope Paul VI issued an
calling implicitly for peace in Vietnam, but interestingly this provoked a response
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Though recognizing "that citizens of all faiths and of differing political
loyalties honestly differ among themselves over the moral issue
involved in this tragic conflict," the USCCB's 1966 letter on "Peace and
Vietnam" ultimately stated that it was "reasonable to argue that
[American] presence in Vietnam is justified., 75 Trumpeting the anticommunist cause, Cardinal Spellman, Military Vicar to Catholics in the
Armed Forces, opined that Vietnam was "a war for civilization.
Certainly it is not a war 76of our seeking. It is a war thrust upon us. We
cannot yield to tyranny.,
Even when American Catholic support for the war dimmed, it was
generally not on grounds that fighting communism was an insufficiently
just cause, but that the costs of doing so in Vietnam had become too
high.77 As the U.S. Catholic Bishops stated in 1971 when it officially
withdrew support for the war: "At this point in history, it seems clear to
us that whatever good we hope to achieve through continued
involvement in this war is now outweighed
by the destruction of human
78
inflicts."
it
which
values
moral
of
life and
Even entering the late twentieth century, the Church continued to
imply that fighting particular ideologies could suffice as a just cause,
even in the absence of physical life-threatening aggression. This trend
defied those who argue that the Church's just war doctrine has actually
become more restrictive since the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s,
an argument that is accurate if limited to considering
wars of physical
79
aggression without ideological implications.
For example, in his World Day of Peace message in 1982, Pope John
Paul evoked the language of traditional aggression to characterize
from Catholic anti-war activists, who believed that Vietnam revolutionaries against America
were fighting guerilla warfare for a just cause, in contrast to the Americans themselves. See
MARC JASON GILBERT, THE VIETNAM WAR ON CAMPUS: OTHER VOICES, MORE DISTANT DRUMS

97 (2001).
75. Raymond J. Crowley, Urge 'Climate of Peace': Prelates Back Moves in Viet,
SARASOTA J., Nov. 21, 1966, at 34.
76. David Lawrence, In Defense of CardinalSpellman's Stand, LEWISTON DAILY SUN,

Jan. 4, 1967, at 4, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1928&dat=19670104&
id=Lmgg AAAAIBAJ&sjid= IGYFAAAAIBAJ&pg=3283,280187.
77. In 1971, the American Catholic hierarchy officially withdrew its support for the war.
In their Resolution on Southeast Asia, the bishops stated:
It is our firm conviction, therefore, that the speedy ending of this war is a moral
imperative of the highest priority. Hence, we feel a moral obligation to appeal
urgently to our nation's leaders and indeed to the leaders of all the nations
involved in this tragic conflict to bring the war to an end with no further delay.
U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, RESOLUTION ON SOUTHEAST ASIA (1971).

78. Id.
79. These arguments arise partly from Pope John XXIII's encyclical Pacem in Terris. See
John XXIII, Pacem In Terris (Apr. 11, 1963).
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communists in the Cold War, despite the "cold" nature of that conflict:
he spoke of the "false peace of totalitarian regimes," arguing that "plans
based on aggression, domination, and the manipulation of others lurk in
human hearts ...

in spite of certain declarations or manifestations of a

pacifist nature." 80 Similarly, while the USCCB's 1983 pastoral letter
opposed nuclear war and nuclear weapons-based deterrence as
inappropriate means of self-defense, it argued that nations continued to
have a moral duty "to protect and preserve those key values of justice,
freedom and independence which are necessary for personal dignity and
national integrity." 81 In stressing these values, the USCCB affirmed the
Church's implicit stance that anti-ideology is sufficient to constitute a
just cause, as separate from physical security and basic existence.
Since the fall of Soviet communism, the Church has had
comparatively fewer opportunities to show whether it still supports war
against particular ideologies or ways of life. As the next section will
further discuss, the wars it has supported have been limited to situations
where life and physical security were unavoidably at stake such as wars
of humanitarian intervention and wars against terrorism. Yet, there is
little evidence to show that the Church has changed its position on the
inclusiveness of just cause. Commencing in 1992, the Bosnian War is a
more current example of the Catholic Church likely interpreting "just
cause" as inclusive of religious freedom. Among other factional lines in
this civil conflict following Yugoslavia's breakup, the war involved a
conflict between Serbians and Croatians, the latter of whom were
predominantly Catholic. 83 Akin to the Spanish Catholic Church during
the 1920s, numerous scholars have accused the Croatian Catholic
Church of propagating Croatian ethnic and religious nationalism in the
lead up to the war, which in turn contributed to the violence. 84 As one
scholar has characterized its role, the Church was guilty of portraying
Croats as "quasi-immaculate" while portraying the Serbs as "the
Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul H for the Celebration of the
80. John Paul 1I,
Day of Peace (Jan. 1, 1982), available at http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/johnpaulii/
messages/peace/documents/hfjp-ii_mes_19811208_xv-world-day-for-peaceen.html.

81.

See USCCB, supra note 6,

82.

See infra Part I.B; see also U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Harvest of

175.

Justice is Sown in Peace, Nov. 17, 1993, available at http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-andteachings/what-we-believe/catholic-social-teaching/the-harvest-of-j ustice-is-sown-in-peace.cfm
(arguing that it is the duty of countries to engage in humanitarian intervention to correct gross
abuses of human rights).
83.
84.

See generally LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, THE DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA (1996).
Alex J. Bellamy, The Catholic Church and Croatia's Two Transitions, 30 REL.,

STATE. & Soc. 45, 50 (2002) (citing scholars who describe the wars "as ethnoreligious in
character," are "adamant that by propagating ethnic Croatian exclusivism the Catholic Church
contributed to the spiral of violent," and argue "that the Catholic Church should be blamed for
presenting the political, social and national conflicts in the former Yugoslavia as centuries-long
conflicts between essentially opposed human types, types of cultures and civilizations.").
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incarnation of evil."85
Others have argued that, while some in the Church did attempt to
propagate such views, Church leadership largely did not, refusing to call
upon Catholic Croats to vote for the Croatian regime in power and
criticizing atrocities committed by Croats. 86 Nevertheless, other wartime
actions reinforced the perception that the Church implicitly encouraged
faith-motivated violence. One in particular is a speech that Pope John
Paul II gave in 1994 during his first pastoral visit to Zagreb, Croatia. In
a speech made while ethnic and religious tensions were high, the Pope
lionized the controversial Croatian Cardinal Stepinac, who led the
Croatian resistance against communism during post-World War II Titov
regime, but who also incurred the wrath of many Serbians who have
long believed that "Stepinac personifies nothing less than Croatian
collaboration with the Nazis through his support for the brutal Ustasha
fascist regime, which murdered as many as 700,000 Serbs, Jews, 87and
Gypsies at the Jesenovac concentration camp during World War 11."
As one scholar has claimed, the Pope's actions may be seen as "a
vestige of his myopic anti-communism," 88 akin to the Church's
consistently unapologetic position on the Spanish Civil War.89 As
another counterargument, others have pointed out that the Pope also
spoke of peace during his speech, sending "a kiss of peace" to the
Serbian leadership while encouraging Croatian Catholics to become
"apostles of a new concord between peoples. ' '90 Nevertheless, one
scholar argued that even a middle ground reading of this speech is
problematic:
Cardinal Stepinac himself can hardly be blamed for strife in the
1980s, but the violence the Pope denounced can still be read back
into the Cardinal's actions. By standing up to one form of
85. See id.(citing Srdan Vrcan, Religion and Churches and the Post-Yugoslav War, in
RELIGION AND NATIONALISM 63-64 (J. Coleman & M. Tonka eds., 1995)).
86. See Bellamy, supra note 84, at 50.
87. P.H. Liotta & Anna Simons, Thicker than Water? Kin, Religion, and Conflict in the
Balkans, PARAMETERS (Winter 1998).
88. As Liotta and Simons state,
Any invocations of the Cardinal are thus charged with meaning, and like the
video image of a Serbian priest ritually blessing Arkan's Tigers, the Pope's
alignment with Stepinac sends all sorts of signals. One way to view the Pope's
refusal to set foot in Yugoslavia until he could pray at the tomb of Stepinac in
Zagreb Cathedral is as a vestige of his myopic anti-communism. Perhaps he
really did forget the Church's wider historical role in the Balkans.
See id.
89.

See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.

90. SABRINA PETRA RAMET, BALKAN BABEL: THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA FROM
THE DEATH OF TITO TO CIVIL WAR 281 (1996).
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Stepinac
repression having lent his support to another, Cardinal
91
prefigures a classic set of Balkan contradictions.
Yet other actions have contributed to the perception that the Church
implicitly approved faith-motivated violence during the Bosnian Warsuch as its recognizing Croatia before the European Union itself did
so. 92 Most recently, Carla del Ponte, the chief war crimes prosecutor in
the Hague, insisted that the Church was sheltering a top Croatian war
crimes suspect, General Ante Gotovina, and that the Vatican was
refusing to cooperate (though the Vatican strongly refuted this
charge).93
The Church's actions during the Bosnian War are certainly open to
interpretation, much more so than its actions during the Spanish Civil
War, the Manchurian Incident, or the Vietnam War. On the one hand,
some figures in the Catholic Church, including Pope John Paul II during
portions of his speech, may have denounced the conflict in general
terms. On the other hand, several aspects of both the Croatian Catholic
Church's and papal actions lend credence to the idea that the Church
continues to support war for ideological or religious reasons, even in the
post-Cold War era.
The Church's alleged support for violence in the name of ideology
and religion even resurfaced during the 2013 ascendency of Argentina's
Cardinal Jorge Bergoglio to Pope Francis. During this ascendency,
some questioned then-Bergoglio's role in the "Dirty War" between
Argentina's communist state and anti-communist guerillas in the
1970s. 94 At an early point during the war, Bergoglio was the provincial
of the Society of Jesus in Argentina, a position through which,
according to his accusers, Bergoglio purposefully identified communistleaning priests for the anti-communist junta to target. 95 On the one hand,
the evidence for Bergoglio's personal active involvement or even tacit
compliance with any violence during the war is dubious. 96 On the other
91.
92.
93.

See Liotta & Simons, supra note 87, at 31.
See id. at 32.
Del Ponte earlier told British newspaper the Daily Telegraph she believed Gen

Gotovina was "hiding in a Franciscan monastery and so the Catholic Church is protecting him."
"I have taken this up with the Vatican and the Vatican totally refuses to co-operate with us," as
she stated. The Church retorted that Ponte had not proven any of her claims. War Crimes Chief
Accuses Vatican, BBC NEWS, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4263426.stm.
Eventually, Gotovina was found in December 2005 in Spain. Top Croatian War Crimes
Fugitive Apprehended in Spain, CNN NEWS (Dec. 8, 2005), available at http://edition.cnn.com/
2005/US/12/08/thursday/index.html?iref-allsearch.
94. Jon Lee Anderson, Pope Francis and the Dirty War, NEW YORKER (Mar. 15, 2013),
available at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/03/pope-francis-jorge-

bergoglio-argentina-dirty-war.html.
95.

See id

96. See id.
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hand, the Argentine Catholic Church's role in the junta's anticommunist campaign is less debatable, with at least some within the
Church definitively
giving active support to this violent ideological
97
campaign.

Though ultimately concerning a conflict from decades ago, this
minor controversy about the recently-elected Pope underscores the
difficulty of concluding that the Church has made a clean break from its
past on this issue. The Church has appeared to back away from more
vocal, explicit support of ideological or religious freedom-based
violence. Nevertheless, its contemporary reticence to take a stronger
stance against such violence, combined with its past history, show that
its interpretation of "just cause" in war is at least more permissive than
what other post-Cold War rhetoric might indicate. This doctrine has
been clear to condemn wars of aggression and territorial conquest, as
well as to restrict the permissiveness of even wars of pure physical selfdefense. However, the Church has been far less unequivocal on its
position with respect to wars where physical self-defense may be mixed
with ostensible ideological or religious defense. Until the Church more
explicitly clarifies that it does not consider these reasons to be "just
causes," its calls for anti-communism and its varying degrees of support
for ethno-religious nationalism in Spain, Vietnam, Argentina, and
Bosnia create a reasonable inference that the Church does have a more
expansive understanding of "just cause"-if not on paper, then in fact.
As Pope Pius XII expressed in his Christmas Message in 1948, the
purpose of peace is "the protection of goods of humanity, inasmuch as
they are gifts of the Creator." 98 Given its support of war for purposes
even outside of self-defense, it is apparent that the Church defines these
goods broadly to include values such as religious freedom, democratic
independence, and other traditionally liberal principles. However noble
those principles are, they fall outside of the theoretically limited
justification for self-defense. Instead, they fall precisely into more
expansive considerations of quality and ways of life, considerations that
are strictly prohibited in other areas of the Church's life ethic.
B. ComparingProportionality/LastResort in Just War to Other
Life Issues
The second tension between applications of the Church's just war
doctrine and its broader life ethic is the inconsistency between what it
considers proportionate military action and proportionate actions in
other life-and-death circumstances. In the context of abortion and
euthanasia, the Church's position on proportionality is clear, dovetailing
97.
98.

See id
Pius XII, Christmas Message of 1948 (Dec. 24, 1948).
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with its position on the intrinsically evil nature of these acts: 99 even
"serious and tragic [circumstances] can never justify the deliberate
killing of an innocent human being."' 00 Thus, "no evaluation of costs
can outweigh the value of the fundamental good which we are trying to
protect, that of human life."'' 1 The Church does recognize that abortion
is often a decision made under difficult, even extreme circumstances.
Nevertheless, nothing is so extreme as to justify the even more extreme
action of taking a life:
[P]erhaps in quite a considerable number of cases, by denying
abortion one endangers important values to which it is normal to
attach great value, and which may sometimes even seem to have
priority. We do not deny these very great difficulties. It may be a
serious question of health, sometimes of life or death, for the
mother; it may be the burden represented by an additional child,
especially if there are good reasons to fear that the child will be
abnormal or retarded; it may be the importance attributed in
different classes of society to considerations of honor or
dishonor, of loss of social standing, and so forth . . . [But] the

damage to moral values is always a greater evil for the common
good than any disadvantage in the economic or demographic
order. 102
Undergirding this position on abortion/euthanasia is the Church's
belief not only that human life is sacred even when weak and
suffering, 0 3 but also that human beings are incapable of making such
evaluations without being motivated by exaggerated panic and anxiety,
even if they have otherwise good intentions.
As Pope John Paul II
stated:

99. See supra text accompanying note 23.
100. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Clarificationon ProcuredAbortion (July
11, 2009) [hereinafter Clarificationon ProcuredAbortion], availableat http://www.vatican.va/
roman curia/congregations/cfaith/documetns/rc con cfaith doc2009071 l-aborto-procurato_
en.html.
101. John Paul II, Address of John Paul II to the Participants in the International
Congress on "Life-Sustaining Treatments and Vegetative State: Scientific Advances and Ethical

Dilemmas" (Mar. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Life-Sustaining Treatments].
102. Declarationon ProcuredAbortion (Nov. 18, 1974),
14, 18.
103. See also John Paul II, Familiaris Consortio (Nov. 22, 1981) [hereinafter Familiaris
Consortio], available at http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/johnpaulii/apost-exhortations/

documents/hfjp-ii exh 19811122_familiaris-consortioen.html; Evangelium Vitae, supra note
1, 63 ("And yet the courage and the serenity with which so many of our brothers and sisters
suffering from serious disabilities lead their lives when they are shown acceptance and love
bears eloquent witness to what gives authentic value to life.").
104.

See FamiliarisConsortio, supra note 103,
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Some ask themselves if it is a good thing to be alive or if it would
be better never to have been born; they doubt therefore if it is
right to bring others into life when perhaps they will curse their
existence in a cruel world with unforeseeable terrors . . . The

ultimate reason for these mentalities is the absence in people's
hearts of God, whose love alone
is stronger than all the world's
05
fears and can conquer them."'
Because of this fear, the Church is concerned that "acknowledging
that increasing and decreasing levels of quality of life, and therefore of
human dignity, can be attributed from an external perspective" will lead
to "a discriminatory and eugenic principle" motivated by nefarious
considerations, such as group exclusion or material mentality.' On this
subject, the Church has recognized that scientific and technical
progress, while offering "the hope of creating a new and better
10 7
humanity," also "causes ever greater anxiety regarding the future."'
"[O]ne thinks, for example, of a certain panic deriving from the studies
of ecologists and futurologists on population growth, which sometimes
exaggerate the danger of demographic increase to the quality of life."' 0 8
Discussing the dangers of "presum[ing] to measure the value of a
human life only within the parameters of 'normality' and physical wellbeing, thus opening the way to 0legitimizing
infanticide," the Church
9
makes a slippery slope argument.'
The Church also emphasizes that people are incapable of making
definitive, non-speculative quality of life determinations, even if such
determinations were morally permissible. After the Terri Schiavo case
brought the issue of life-sustaining treatments for those in "persistent
vegetative states" to the political foreground, Pope John Paul II argued
that even significant advances in medical technology could not
definitively establish that patients in this condition no longer possessed
biological and psychological characteristics that have universally
defined basic quality of life:" 0
[I]t is not possible to rule out a priori that the withdrawal of
nutrition and hydration, as reported by authoritative studies, is the
source of considerable suffering for the sick person, even if we
can see only the reactions at the level of the autonomic nervous
system or of gestures. Modern clinical neurophysiology and
105.

Id.

106.

Life-Sustaining Treatments, supra note 101,

107.

See FamiliarisConsortio, supra note 103,

108.
109.

Id.
Evangelium Vitae, supra note 1, 63.

110.

See Life Sustaining Treatments, supra note 101.
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neuro-imaging techniques, in fact, seem to point to the lasting
quality in these patients of elementary forms of communication
and analysis of stimuli."'
Thus, the Church distrusts human decision-making about quality of
life even when based on advanced technology. Reinforcing the
Vatican's position, the USCCB argued that Schiavo was merely a
person who had "cognitive disabilities" and who was unable to feed
herself, retaining "every ounce of her human dignity and deserv[ing]
respect and care." ' 2 Regarding the removal of Schiavo's feeding tube,
the USCCB stated that "it was not a right to remove medical treatment
1
that was granted, but an order that Terri Schiavo be made to die." 13
The Church's position on proportionality and capital punishment
draws upon similar principles, even as it does not deem capital
punishment an intrinsic evil. As Part I discussed, the instances in which
capital punishment would be a proportionate self-defense mechanism
are "very rare, if practically non-existent." '1 4 The Church states that
alternatives such as life sentences without parole are sufficient to
protect society. 1 5 As with its position on abortion and euthanasia, what
undergirds this position on capital punishment is the idea that one
cannot predict what a person might contribute to society in the future,
particularly if they take corrective actions.11 6 As the USCCB states,
"We cannot know whether God has a purpose for a person's life, even
one who has committed a terrible crime and must spend his or her life
behind bars."' 1 7 Implicit is that one cannot consider the future quality of
life of a criminal offender, and that doing so would be an impermissibly
speculative exercise.
When one analyzes these principles in tandem with the Church's just
war doctrine, it becomes clear that principles such as proportionality
111.

Id.

112. Cathy Cleaver Ruse, Terri Schiavo Case Reveals How We Treat DisabledAmericans,
LIFENEWS.COM (Mar. 24, 2005), available at http://archive.lifenews.com/bio84 l.html.
113. Cathy Cleaver Ruse, Terri Schiavo and the Echoes of Abortion, USCCB (Mar. 31,
2005), availableat http://old.usccb.org/prolife/publicat/lifeissues/033105.shtml.

114.

See supra text accompanying note 39.

115. USCCB, What is the Catholic Church's Position on the Use of the Death Penalty,
availableat http://old.usccb.org/deathpenalty/questionsanswers.shtml.
116. But cf Summa, supra note 19.
The fact that the evil ones, as long as they live, can be corrected from their
errors does not prohibit the fact that they may be justly executed, for the danger
which threatens from their way of life is greater and more certain than the good
which may be expected from their improvement.

Id.
117.

See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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and last resort must be read narrowly. The Church's consistent
opposition to the idea that one can make definitive calculations about
the value of people's lives should guide military actions. On the one
hand, a principle such as macro-proportionality in the military
context-that is, calculating whether the good to be gained is worth the
destruction of war, including the loss of innocent lives-is an inherently
abstract exercise. In its 1983 pastoral letter, the USSCB admitted that
applying these principles is difficult and potentially imprecise, even
notwithstanding "the ease with which nations and individuals either
assume or delude themselves into believing that God or right is clearly
on their side."'118 On the other hand, this uncertainty is precisely another
reason to allow the Church's broader life ethic to guide a narrow
application of just war principles in practice. Because the Church
frowns heavily upon speculative calculations about the value of
people's lives, military actions should be strictly limited to those that
confer demonstrably ample advantages, while causing demonstrably
limited destruction, particularly in the way of innocent lives.
In reality, however, just war principles have been applied more
broadly than would be consistent with the Church's broader life ethic.
The Church's sanctioning of wars into the twenty-first century
establishes this proposition. The Bosnian War is the first example of the
Church's implicitly broader reading of proportionality and last resort.
In a speech from January 1994, Pope John Paul II urged "all forms
of action aimed at disarming the aggressor" in Bosnia. 119 The Pope
emphasized that, while "all military aggression is judged to be morally
wrong, [1]egitimate defense, by contrast, is viewed as admissible and
sometimes obligatory."' 120 Other remarks by the Vatican appeared to
indicate support for selective military strikes, with Vatican spokesman
Joaquin Navarro-Valls speaking specifically in the language of
proportionality by declaring that "it is not the same thing to bombard
Belgrade12 1or a mountaintop where some soldiers have placed a
mortar."

In supporting such action, however, the Church may have read the
principle of last resort too broadly. At the time, American diplomatic
peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia had infamously stalled for two years,
undercutting more aggressive European efforts to end the conflict
through less violent means, such as dividing Bosnia into semi-

118. See USCCB, supra note 6, 94.
119. Alan Cowell, Pope Seeks a Disarming of "Aggressor" in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
13, 1994), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/13/world/pope-seeks-a-disarming-ofaggressor-in-bosnia.html.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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autonomous regions along ethnic lines. 122 Casting a shadow on Bill
Clinton's presidency, these bumpy diplomatic forays raise the question
of whether the Vatican's ostensible sanctioning of military action in
January 1994 is reconcilable with its position on last resort.
At that time, more diplomatic efforts may still have been possible, in
contrast to the outright military response (i.e. 3NATO military strikes)
that catalyzed the end of the war in mid-1995. On the one hand, likely
few would disagree that the United States stepped in very late in Bosnia.
On the other hand, earlier efforts might have proven even less violent,
simultaneously preventing the loss of life that occurred during 1994 and
1995 when there was effectively diplomatic and military inaction. In
turn, the timing of the Vatican's greater support to military action raises
questions as to its position on what qualifies as last resort.
Beyond the Church's sanctioning of humanitarian intervention as in
Bosnia, an even clearer example of how it interprets proportionality and
last resort is its response to the post-September 11 war on terrorism. Its
support of the American military efforts in Afghanistan immediately
following September 11 seemed particularly to contravene a narrow
reading of proportionality vis-di-vis the Church's broader life ethic.
Though Pope John Paul II did not issue a public statement explicitly
supporting America's decisions to invade Afghanistan, by all accounts
he privately and publicly (if implicitly) signaled support for this
decision. 124 Publicly, a papal spokesperson told the media that the
125
Vatican "would understand" if President Bush were to use force.
While the spokesperson was careful to argue that the Church had not
necessarily given a "green light" to the use of force, he carefully
characterized any such action as "not a matter of an attack, but of active
prevention against a threat that has already manifested itself in the
horror of a few weeks ago."' 126 The Vatican's top ecumenical official
similarly stated, "Every country must defend itself in a just manner.
Something,,127has to be done, or else we will all become hostages of these
terrorists.
Finally, in 2002, a few months after the military campaign
in Afghanistan had begun, the Pope's annual message for the World
122.

See Elaine Sciolino, The Clinton Record: Foreign Policy, Bosnia Policy Shaped by

U.S. Military Role, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 1996), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/

29/us/the-clinton-record-foreign-policy-bosnia-policy-shaped-by-us-military-role.htm?page
wanted=all&src=pm.
123. See id
124.

Vatican Signals Wider, Qualified Support for US. Military Action, AMERICA: THE

NAT'L CATH. WKLY. (Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://www.americamagazine.org/content/
article.cfm?articleid =1073 [hereinafter Vatican].
125.

John L. Allen Jr., Mixed Messages on Force Abound During Papal Trip, NAT'L

CATH. REP. (Oct. 5, 2001), http://natcath.orgNCROnline/archives2/200ld/100501/1005
01k.htm.
126. Id.
127. See Vatican, supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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Day of Peace stressed the existence of "a right to defend oneself against
terrorism," ' 128 a statement that stands in contrast to the frequent and very
explicit condemnation of the Pope in the Iraq War only two years
later.129 In fact, as both wars proceeded simultaneously, Catholics
would frequently draw a contrast between the unjustness of the 30
Iraq
War and the continuing necessity of military action in Afghanistan.'
Support among the USCCB and individual American Cardinals was
even more explicit and overwhelming. The USCCB officially stated that
"[m]ilitary force may be justified in Afghanistan," though iterating that
just war criteria such as proportionality must guide U.S. actions. The
President of the USCCB personally expressed regret for the use of
force, but ultimately praised President Bush for carrying out "a wise,
just and effective response."' 132 Other cardinals, including those of
Chicago, Detroit, New York, and Philadelphia, expressed that U.S.
bombings were a "military necessity."' 33 As one cardinal stated, the
administration should be
commended for the manner in which this war has been conducted
so far. The formation of an international coalition, the shared
intelligence and coordinated efforts of national and international
law enforcement agencies and the steps undertaken to cut off the
terrorists' financial
resources are all part of a well-conceived and
34
effective plan.'

Condemnation of the war among the Catholic community appeared
limited to very few, most prominently the Catholic peace organization
Pax Christi USA, which implored "leaders to focus their creative
energies on a renewed commitment to'' 35building an international order
based on ... justice rather than might.

128. Pope John Paul 11, Message for the World Day of Peace 2002 (Jan. i, 2002),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/johnpaulii/messages/peace/documents/hfjpii mes 20011211 xxxv-world-day-for-peace en.html.
129. Pope John Paul II, Address to the Diplomatic Corps, Jan. 13, 2003, available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/speeches/2003/january/documents/hfjp-ii
spe_
20030113 diplomatic-corps en.html.
130. See, e.g., Russell Shaw, War in Afghanistan May No Longer Be Just, OSV DAILY
TAKE, available at http://www.osvdailytake.com/2010/08/shaw-war-in-afghanistan-may-nolonger.html.
131. USCCB, PastoralMessage: Living with Faith and Hope After September 11 (Nov.
2001) available at http://www.usccb.org/ issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/septemberI i/a-pastoral-message-living-with-faith-and-hope-after-september- 1 .cfm.
132. Bombs: A One-Size-Fits-All Response, NAT'L CATH. REP. (Oct. 19, 2001), available
at http://natcath.org/NCROnline/archives/ 10 1901/101901 p.htm.
133. Id.
134. CardinalBevilacqua Tells President Bush the War is Just (Oct. 16, 2001), available
at http://www.americancatholic.org/News/JustWar/usbishopsterrorism.asp.
135. Pax Christi USA, Official Statement on the Bombing of Afghanistan (Oct. 9, 2001),
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On its face, America's Church-sanctioned military efforts might
seem to have been an ethically adherent response to the violence
undertaken by the September 11 terrorists and al-Qaeda. However, these
efforts become problematic when seen through the lens of the Church's
broader life ethic. Several aspects of the military response seem to
contradict proportionality and last resort when the Church's broader life
ethic is used to interpret these principles. For example, some have
criticized the swiftness of the military response. On one hand, though
the United States attempted diplomacy with the Taliban government in
Afghanistan, the Taliban consistently rebuffed American requests to
provide them access to al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan.' 36 On the other
hand, Church-backed American military efforts began less than a month
after September 11 took place.
As a useful comparison, the Church condemned America's actions
during the 1991 Gulf War in large part because of the Church's beliefs
that war was not yet the last resort, though more than five months had
elapsed since Iraq had invaded and annexed Kuwait. 137 Among others
during the Gulf War, then-President of the USCCB Archbishop
Pilarcyzk expressed "fear that

. . .

moving beyond the deployment of

military forces in an effort to deter Iraqi aggression to the undertaking
of offensive military action could well violate Dust war] criteria,
especially the principles of proportionality and last resort."' 31 Given a
life ethic that values utmost certainty before life is taken, even for
gravely urgent causes, the Church's position in the Gulf War appears
much more in line with Church doctrine than its implicit position that
the United States had exhausted all possible non-military options in less
than one month with respect to Afghanistan.
An even greater problem with the Church's sanctioning of
America's military response is not only the timing of that response, but
the degree of uncertainty involved in determining proportionality at the
outset. The September 11 terrorist attacks were horrific. Furthermore,
because of the nature of terrorism, there was naturally a possibility of
violent terrorist attacks at some point in the future. For these reasons,
one might argue that the military response was both proportionate and a
last resort. Yet, as the USCCB has stated in the context of capital
punishment, the self-defense test must be "whether society has
available at http://paxchristiusa.org/2011/01/16/statement-pax-christi-usa-official-statement-on-

the-bombing-of-afghanistan/.
136.

Bush Rejects Taliban Offer to Hand Bin Laden Over, GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2001),

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/14/afghanistan.terrorism5.
137. See Laurence W. Jones, The Persian Gulf War: A Case Study in Just War Theory
(May 4, 1998) (Master of Theology, thesis, Duke University), app. D, at 109-13, Letter from
Archbishop Pilarczyk to President Bush (Nov. 15, 1990) (on file with Defense Technical

Information Center).
138.
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alternative ways to protect itself, not how terrible the crime was."
More importantly, both the potential benefits and costs of invading
Afghanistan were difficult to assess with any degree of certainty.
Because terrorism is unlike a conventional war between two
sovereignties, instead involving a diffuse network of aggressors located
in many sovereignties, it was uncertain to what degree uprooting alQaeda specifically in Afghanistan would repel any threats of
aggression. For example, while al-Qaeda was undoubtedly responsible
for the September 11 attacks, it was difficult to pinpoint when, and even
with certainty if, it would strike again in the future.
The difficulty of conceptualizing the degree to which invading
Afghanistan would achieve America's self-defensive goals dovetails
with the difficulty of comprehending the costs of such an invasion. On
the one hand, American military officials made assurances that the
means of war employed would minimize casualties, particularly
American casualties and Afghani civilian casualties. 140 For example, the
military limited its actions to targeted aerial strikes on known al-Qaeda
and Taliban compounds, at least at the beginning of the war. 141 On the
other hand, while certainly limiting American soldier casualties,
limiting on-the-ground military presence made it more difficult
simultaneously to know both ex ante how many Afghani civilians' lives
were at risk and ex post how many of these lives had been taken by
American military action.142 The infamous Qalaye Niazi incident on
December 29, 2001 exemplified this problem. There, the United States
aerially bombed what they claimed to be a known al-Qaeda-Taliban
compound in Qaloye Niazi, citing secondary explosions that occurred
after the bombing as proof of this claim. 4 3 However, the Qalaye Niazi
village elder claimed that civilians had merely been ordered by
retreating Taliban troops to store ammunition at this site, which
included housing for ten families of farmers. 144 Ultimately, 52 civilians
145
died, many of whom were merely visiting the village for a wedding.
Aside from highlighting the difficulties of cost calculation, this
incident highlights the moral complexities of relying heavily on allies
for military intelligence, without sufficient supplementation of forces on
the ground. As Pax Christi argued:

139.

See USCCB, supra note 115.

140.

See Rumsfeld: Operation Aims to Clear the Skies, CNN.com (Oct. 7. 2001),

http://www-cgi.cnn.com/2001/US/10/07/ret.attack.pentagon/.
141. Id.
142. See also Group of Catholics Calls Terrorism Battle Immoral, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 27,
2001), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/200 I/dec/27/20011227-034315-501 Or/.
143. See Rory Carroll, Bloody Evidence of U.S. Blunder, GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2002).
144. Id.
145. Id.
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The Pentagon goes to extraordinary lengths to avoid
noncombatant casualties within the limits it places on itself in
order to avoid putting U.S. military personnel at risk. And it is
precisely this qualifier that puts into question the morality of the
U.S. bombing campaign in Afghanistan... The choice to bomb
the village instead of sending troops into the village was a
deliberate and intentional
choice that put at risk innocent women,
146
children, and men.

Pax Christi continues:
The fact that many of these villages were nothing more than a
few dozen small buildings make their bombing even more
incomprehensible. The deployment of an overwhelming number
of ground forces on such a small asset would most likely have
resulted in the quick departure of any enemy soldiers without a
great deal of resistance. But I suppose that allowing the47enemy to
escape would be unacceptable to our military planners. 1
In the end, Qalaye Niazi was far from an anomaly with respect to
civilian casualties: estimates of these casualties up to January 1 year
alone ranged from 1000 to 4000.148
This Article is far from the first to analyze how post-September 11
warfare makes it difficult to interpret and apply traditional just war
principles such as proportionality. 149 Given these difficulties, it may not
be surprising that, while various Catholic authorities invoked just war
theory to support their contention that military action in Afghanistan
was morally principled, few, if any, were able to specify precisely how
the war (or specific military actions) fit into that theory. For example,
while the USCCB issued a statement stating that "special attention must
146.

TOM CORDARO, THE CALCULUS OF KILLING THE INNOCENT: CASUALTY AVERSION &

THE PRINCIPAL OF NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY (2001), available at http://storage.paxchristi.
net/SD1 E02.pdf.
147. Id.
148. Murray Campbell, Thousands of Afghans Likely Killed in Bombings, COMMON
DREAMS (Jan. 3, 2001), availableat http://www. commondreams.org/headlines02/0103-01 .htm.
149. See, e.g., Marjorie Cohn, Bombing of Afghanistan is Illegal and Must Be Stopped,
JURIST (Nov. 6, 2001); Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., Reflections on Just Wars and Just Warriors, 47 J.

CATH. LEGAL STUD. 343 (2008) (discussing varying responses by Catholic officials to the 2003
Iraq War); Ronald J.Rychlak, Just War Theory, InternationalLaw, and the War in Iraq, 2 AVE

MARIA L. REV. 1 (2004) (arguing for an alteration of the scope of just war principles postSeptember 11); George Weigel, The Just War Tradition and the World After September 11, 51

CATH. U. L. REV. 689 (2002) (same); William Joseph Wagner, As Justice and PrudenceDictate:
The Morality of America's War Against Terrorism-A Response to James V. Schall, S.J, 51
CATH. U. L. REV. 35 (2001); see also John F. Coverdale, An Introduction to the Just War
Tradition, 16 PACE INT'L L. REV. 221, 236-38 n.50 (2004) (discussing shift in Catholic
doctrine).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol26/iss1/4

28

Lim: Just War and the Roman Catholic Life Ethic
JUST WAR AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC LIFE ETHIC

be given to developing criteria for when it is appropriate to end military
action in Afghanistan," in the end, no authority ever explicitly proffered
such criteria.150 How just war theory should respond to the uncertainty
of the nature of terrorism was (and is) an issue remaining unspecified.'S5
What has not been discussed before is how America's response to
September 11, and particularly the Church's support for the invasion of
Afghanistan, flouts the Church's broader life ethic. As others have done,
one could argue that traditional just war principles must change to
accommodate the changing nature of war. However, this proposition
becomes much more difficult to accept when considering that those just
war principles operate in the background of a broader life ethic. The
Church spurns attempts to make speculative judgments about life in
other contexts. Therefore, any alteration or relaxation of just war
principles cannot fully yield to the fact that terrorism itself has an
inherently uncertain nature. For example, to the extent that the Church
adopts the position that technology and science only speculatively
establish that patients in persistent vegetative states live a certain quality
of life, the Church cannot then allow overly speculative calculations in
decisions to fight war. This is especially true when potential alternatives
exist to make calculations less provisional, such as on-the-ground troop
presence, even when those alternatives entail additional costs. After all,
in other areas of its life ethic such as PVS and capital punishment, the
Church requires the pursuit of all viable alternatives despite their costs
before permitting the extinguishment of life.
With the rise of technologies such as unmanned aerial drones even
since the beginning of the Afghanistan War, the Church must reconcile
these positions with its positions on war now more so than ever. Later in
the Afghanistan War, the U.S. military increased its use of these drones
in part because of the belief that, with the greater precision they
provide, they could minimize civilian casualties. 152 Nevertheless, as
others have argued, the greater ease with which these mechanisms can
be deployed could actually increase the number of raids and
consequently the civilian casualty rates. 53 For example, a Human
Rights Watch report on civilian casualties in Afghanistan argued that
most civilian casualties did not occur in planned airstrikes on Taliban
150. USCCB, PastoralMessage: Living with Faith and Hope After September 11(2001),
available at http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/september-I1/apastoral-message-living-with-faith-and-hope-after-september- I 1.cfm.
151. At the time that this Article is being published, the Catholic Church still has failed to

put forth a just war doctrine in order to respond to the reality that terrorism creates a lot of
uncertainty, thus potentially changing the rules of war.
152. Ben Kiernan & Taylor Owen, Roots of U.S. Troubles in Afghanistan: Civilian
Bombing Casualties and the Cambodian Precedent,ASIA-PACIFIC J. (June 28, 2010), available

at http://www.japanfocus.org/-ben-kiernan/3380.
153.
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targets, but rather in the more fluid rapid-response strikes. 154 One U.S.
military report found that "inaccurate and unprofessional" reporting by
the drone operators has
55 been responsible for a not insignificant number
of civilian casualties. 1

Thus, the Church's distrust of technology in other contexts entails
that, at least to some extent, it must distrust technology claimed to limit
the cost of war, particularly given that such technology has indeed
proven to be fallible. In the abortion and assisted suicide context, the
Church argues that technology has been employed to reduce the body to
"pure materiality" and to "simply a complex of organs, functions and
energies to be used according to the sole criteria of pleasure and
efficiency."' 56 Consequently, the Church must also speak out against the
use of technology to shield the military and the greater public from the
erroneous notion that civilian suffering has been minimal. Furthermore,
to the extent that the Church worries that even people with good
intentions will make decisions about abortion/euthanasia in exaggerated
fear and anxiety, creating a slippery slope of what is considered morally
permissible, so it must worry that people under the threat of terrorism
will do the same.
Beyond abortion and assisted suicide, what might best show the
internal inconsistencies of the Church's life ethic might be its stance on
capital punishment. Like war and unlike abortion or assisted suicide,
this practice is not considered intrinsically evil. In accord with this idea,
the Church leaves open the possibility that capital punishment may be
necessary in "very rare" circumstances.
Although not explicitly
qualifying what qualifies as such a circumstance, Pope John Paul II's
reference to "steady improvements in the organization of the penal
system" indicates that capital punishment might be permissible in
instances where, because of a country's primitive infrastructure, apenal
system cannot securely keep those who have committed murder.' 5 This
doctrine on capital punishment is still restrictive, disallowing the death
penalty even when people have been proven to be grave threats and
there is the alternative of a penal infrastructure that, however otherwise
rudimentary, can still reasonably secure these threats. This stands in
contrast to the Church's application of just war theory, where it has
sanctioned military action even when the extent of the threat of
particular targets is arguably less well-known (as compared to proven
murderers) and when there are alternative on-the-ground options that
could save more civilian lives.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Evangelium Vitae, supra note 1, 23.
See supra text accompanying note 39.
Evangelium Vitae, supra note 1, 56.
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C. ComparingDiscriminationin Just War to Intent/Foresightin Other
Life Issues
The third tension between applications of the Church's just war
doctrine and its broader life ethic is the Church's relatively permissive
stance on intentional versus foreseen killing, in contrast to the restrictive
stance on this issue it applies elsewhere in its life ethic. In the context of
assisted suicide, the Church permits palliative care, or pain
management. However, it restricts the possibility of recasting certain
medical actions leading to death as palliative care, arguing that such
actions violate double-effect doctrine. Persistent vegetative states are
again an important example. The Church forbids the removal of
medically-assisted nutrition and hydration from these patients "who can
reasonably be expected to live indefinitely if given such care."1 5 9 Such
care becomes optional only when "they cannot reasonably be expected
to prolong life or when they would be excessively burdensome for the
patient or [would] cause significant physical discomfort."1 6 In other
words, only if there is certainty beyond reasonability that life cannot be
prolonged does removal of medical care not constitute a means or end
of intentional killing, but rather a means or end of palliative care in
itself. Even if a doctor or family member reasonably believes that they
are respecting life's boundaries by removing care and have no intention
to kill but instead to engage in palliative care, they implicitly violate the
Church's doctrine if they do so without greater certainty that life cannot
be prolonged by such care.
The Church's position on abortion with respect to intent and
foresight is even more restrictive. On the one hand, the Church does
allow for some medical treatments intended to preserve the health of the
mother so long as the treatment is not abortive in itself, because such
treatment would 16entail that abortion is technically used neither as a
means or an end.
If, for example, saving the life of the future mother,
independently of her condition of pregnancy, urgently required a
surgical procedure or another therapeutic application, which
would have as an accessory consequence, in no way desired or
intended, but inevitable, the death of the fetus, such an action

159. USCCB, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services 58
(2009). See also Life-Sustaining Treatments, supra note 101, 4 ("the administration of water
and food, even when provided by artificial means, always represents a natural means of
preserving life, not a medical act").
160. Id.
161. Cf supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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162
could not be called a direct attack on the innocent life.

On the other hand, the Church interprets this exception extremely
narrowly. Thus, it does not permit some medical treatments that could
be classified as self-defense, that is producing death not by an evil
effect, but directly by the immediate action of self-defense. 163 As
scholar Susan T. Nicholson points out, the Church would permit a
woman in early pregnancy with cervical cancer to have a hysterectomy,
though without the hysterectomy the fetus would otherwise develop
normally, or a woman to remove her fallopian tubes if a fetus was
growing there instead of her uterus. 164 In both cases, the procedure is
directed not at the fetus itself, but a particular part of the anatomy.
However, the Church would not permit a craniotomy in the case of a
woman in a prolonged obstructed labor, who will die unless an
operation is performed in which the head of the unborn fetus is crushed
16
even if the craniotomy is not performed the fetus will also likely die. 3
Yet, one may cast this instance as the narrowing of the fetus's headand not the death of the fetus, in and of itself-that is the means to the
end of the mother health, with the death of the fetus only foreseen as an
evil effect that is not itself the means.1 66 "That the narrowing of the
head and not the death of the fetus is the means to this end is
demonstrated by the fact that the fetus would not be killed should it
somehow survive the force applied to its skull and be removed alive
from the birth canal."' 167 Nor would the Church permit abortion for a
woman in early pregnancy suffering from chronic hypertension
associated with severe renal insufficiency, even if there is a reasonable
likelihood that she will die because of the demands placed on her by the
pregnancy and the chances of the fetus's survival is slight either way. 168
Perhaps best showing the restrictiveness of the Church's ethic is its
official position on the case of Angela Carder, one at the intersection of
both end-of-life and beginning-of-life.16 9 In 1987, twenty-six weeks into
her pregnancy, an earlier bout of cancer (Ewing's sarcoma) was

162.

See Clarificationon ProcuredAbortion, supra note 100.

163. See Summa, supra note 19 ("Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two
effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor.").
164.

Susan T. Nicholson, The Roman Catholic Doctrine of Therapeutic Abortion, in

FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY 387, 387-88 (M. Vetterling-Braggin et al. eds., 1977).
165. Id. at 388.
166. Id. at 392.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See Terry E. Thornton & Lynn Paltrow, The Rights of Pregnant Patients: Carder
Case Brings Bold Policy Initiatives, HEALTHSPAN (Jan. 31, 1991), available at http://advocates
forpregnantwomen.org/main/publications/articles and reports/the-rightsof pregnantpatients

_carder case brings boldpolicyinitiatives.php.
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discovered to have metastasized to Carder's lungs. 170 Her plan was to
begin radiation and chemotherapy immediately, regardless of the risks
to the fetus. 17 1 Disagreeing with her choice and believing (but not
unanimously) that she had only days to live, her doctors refused to treat
her cancer despite her insistence, instead inserting an oral feeding tube
and administering sedatives to delay her death and increase her fetus's
chance of development. 172 Concerned that she had not elected to have a
C-section, the doctors obtained a court order for one, aided by the
testimony of a neonatologist (but not Carder's own) that the fetus had a
60% chance of survival. 73 Despite Carder's pleas that she did not want
that procedure done, it was performed anyway.1 74 Ultimately, neither
175
the baby nor Carder survived beyond days after the procedure.
Throughout, and as expressed by the amicus curiae brief it filed in
support of the doctors, the USCCB argued that "the decision to save
[Carder's]

unborn child properly recognized

. . . the futility of

improving A.C.'s situation."'16 The USCCB asserted that Angela's
legally recognized interest in her "own
177 health and well-being" could not
"have been promoted by [Carder]."'
Analyzing these ethical positions in tandem with the
conceptualization of discrimination in just war theory, there is little
articulable reason to apply the concepts of intent and foresight any less
restrictively. As the Carder example shows, not only must empirical
uncertainty err on the side of preserving life-even at substantial, grave
sacrifice-but one should also not be able to recast the taking of life as
collateral consequences that are neither means nor ends. First,
analogizing from the PVS context, there must be a substantial deal of
certainty as to who qualifies as combatants and non-combatants before
engaging in military action, subjective individual intent aside. Second,
there must be some limit as to the moral permissibility of arguing that a
military action that kills non-combatants has this effect only
collaterally-that is, not part and parcel as a direct means to selfdefense-just as the Church implicitly adopts the position that the
narrowing of a fetus's head is part and parcel of the means of fetal
killing to save a mother's life.
Nevertheless, as the Church's sanctioning of the American initial
military efforts in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Libya demonstrate,
170.
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172.
173.
174.
175.
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Id.
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176. Brief for U.S. Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, In re
A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (87-609).
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contemporary applications of just war principles are inconsistent with
the broader life ethic's conceptualization of discrimination. For
example, during the Bosnian War, the NATO strikes mostly focused on
military sites, such as munitions storage sites, heavy weapons, and air
defense in the vicinity of safe areas, or what the military deemed as
having only "medium" risk of collateral damage if attacked. 178 This
strategy was likely responsible for the relatively minimal casualties
incurred by either side, military and civilians included. However,
NATO also targeted many "joint use" sites, including key bridges, as
well as sites located in179or next to civilian dwellings, such as barracks
and radio relay towers.
On the one hand, NATO had a clear, deliberate plan in place to
minimize civilian casualties in these instances of military action. For
example, it did not strike sites located adjacent to civilian dwellings
unless it had precluded that an errant weapon would cause unintended
harm, and targets were often hit so late at night as to minimize the
likelihood that even military personnel would be hurt. 180 On the other
hand, from an ex ante perspective, the strategy to target deliberately and
knowingly both joint use and civilian-adjacent sites highlights the
potentially minimal gap that actually exists between intent and
foresight. Regardless of the efforts used to minimize civilian casualties,
that these sites could be targets at all exemplifies the difficulty in
extricating these concepts from each other.
Similar criticisms can be leveled at the Church-sanctioned military
campaigns in Afghanistan and Libya. 18 1 Military efforts in Qalaye
Niazi, Afghanistan resulted in civilian deaths that may have been
avoided with greater on-the-ground presence, providing a greater degree
82
of discrimination between combatants and non-combatants.1
Organizations such as Pax Christi USA have further criticized the
campaign for targeting infrastructure, such as civilian power plants, that
183
was ostensibly critical to sustaining large non-combatant populations.
As one scholar states, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's claims
that the United States was "focused totally on military targets . . .
depend[ed] upon accepting that U.S. attacks against the main telephone
exchange in Kabul, the electrical grid in Kandahar, and the
hydroelectric power station adjacent to the Kajaki dam constituted

178.

See

HUMANITARIAN

ROBERT

C.

OWEN,

CONSTRAINTS

OPERATION

IN

AEROSPACE

DELIBERATE

WARFARE

FORCE:

62

A

CASE

(2001),

STUDY

ON

available at

http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Owen2001 .pdf.
179. Id.at 63.
180. Id. at 65.
181.

See supra Part II.B.

182.
183.

Id.
See Pax Christi USA, supra note 135.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol26/iss1/4

34

Lim: Just War and the Roman Catholic Life Ethic
JUST WAR AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC LIFE ETHIC

184
legitimate military targets."'
The 2011 NATO bombing campaign in Libya, supported by Church
officials particularly in the United States, is similar in these regards.
Although the USCCB was not as consistently vocal in its support of this
campaign as compared to Afghanistan, it stated that the campaign
"appeared to meet" the just cause criterion, furthermore directly
"recognizing [that] serious efforts are being made to avoid directly
targeting civilians."' 85 Though Vatican support was less robust, Pope
Benedict XVI did not condemn the attacks until well after U.N. Security
Council-backed bombings had started, s 6 merely expressing "fear and
trepidation" about the situation until then. 87 Yet, the same moral
questions regarding discrimination arise as they did in Afghanistan. For
example, how much better could efforts to avoid killing civilians have
worked with traditional on-the-ground presence? 88 Even just in the
opening days of the attack, one might legitimately question the
military's decision to target Moammar Gadhafi's compound, which
contained apparatuses crucial to the dictator's command and control
over Libyan forces, but which also contained residential facilities where
non-combatants were usually housed. 189 Given that NATO itself
admitted that the nighttime timing 190
of many attacks made it difficult to
ascertain civilian deaths ex post,
one could further inquire as to
whether attempts to ascertain potential deaths ex ante could have been
sufficient. As with the military campaign Afghanistan, it is undeniable
that NATO took many steps to avoid harming civilians, often not
damaging civilian infrastructure useful to the Libyan government.191
The New York Times pointed out:

184. Nicholas J. Wheeler, Protecting Afghan Civilians from the Hell of War (2001),
availableat http://essays.ssrc.org/l Oyears after91 I/protecting-afghan-civilians-from-the-hell-ofwar/#fn-251-24.
185. USCCB, Letter to Thomas E. Donilon, National Security Advisor (Mar. 24, 2011),
available at http://old.usccb.org/sdwp/intemational/callafrica/2011-03-24BishopHubbardto
NationalSecurityAdvisor.pdf.
186. See John Thavis, Pope Calls for Suspension of Fighting in Libya, CATH. HERALD
(Mar. 28, 2011), availableat http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2011/03/28/pope-calls-forsuspension-of-fighting-in-libya/.
187. Francis X. Rocca, Pope Benedict Stays Neutral on Libya Attacks, RELIGIOUS NEWS
SERVICE (Mar. 21, 2011), availableat http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/21/pope-neithercondemns-end n 838737.html
188. See supra Part I.B.
189. See CNN Wire Staff, Coalition Targets Gadhafi Compound, CNN (Mar. 21, 2011),
availableat http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/03/20/libya.civil.war/index.html.
190. Mark Townsend, Operation Odyssey Dawn Commences to End Gaddafi Onslaught
on Benghazi, GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 2011), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011 /
mar/I 9/operation-odyssey-dawn-tomahawks-libya.
191. C.J. Chivers & Eric Schmitt, In Strikes on Libya by NATO, An Unspoken Civilian
Toll, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/world/
africa/scores-of-uninten ded-casualties-in-nato-war-in-libya.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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While the overwhelming preponderance of strikes seemed to
have hit their targets without killing noncombatants, many factors
contributed to a run of fatal mistakes. These included a
technically faulty bomb, poor or dated intelligence and the near
absence of experienced military personnel on the ground who
could help direct airstrikes. The alliance's apparent presumption
that residences thought to harbor pro-Qaddafi forces were not
occupied by civilians repeatedly proved mistaken, the evidence
suggests, posing a reminder to advocates of air power that no
war is cost- or error-free. NATO's response to allegations of
mistaken attacks had long been carefully worded denials and
insistence that its operations were devised and supervised with
exceptional care. Faced with credible allegations that it killed
civilians, the alliance said it had neither the capacity for nor
intention of 1investigating
and often repeatedthat disputed strikes
92
were sound.

Naturally, one can argue that intentionally not placing more troops
on the ground saved American soldiers' lives in both Afghanistan and
Libya. Nevertheless, principles of intent and foresight in other areas of
life ethic have never abrogated the need for certainty in ensuring that
innocent lives cannot somehow be spared, regardless of subjective
intent, even when actual physical self-defense is at stake. The example
of persistent vegetative states may not be perfectly analogous because
of the absence of self-defensive goals in that instance. However, some
cases of abortion to save the mother's life may be instructive. In the
circumstance of a woman in prolonged obstructed labor, even though
the mother will certainly die without a craniotomy (a self-defensive
purpose), that the fetus has even a slim chance of survival even if the
mother dies leads to the Church's position that a craniotomy is morally
illicit because it is intentional killing. 193 This position stands even if the
doctor or the mother herself wholeheartedly believes that she merely
foresees, not intends the fetus's death.
This example points to another problem in the Church's applications
of discrimination, beyond its contravention of the idea that uncertainty
when life is at stake must err on the side of preserving life. In particular,
the Church's application of discrimination in war is inconsistent with
the idea, pervasive in abortion, that one can seldom conceptualize
killing innocents as a foreseen collateral consequence, rather than an
intended means or end in itself. In the craniotomy example, one is
prevented from arguing that the death of the fetus was actually a
192.
193.

Id. (emphasis added).
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collateral consequence, and that the narrowing of the fetus's head per se
was the means toward the end of maternal health. Applying this level of
stringency to the war context, one should not permissively be able to
argue that killing non-combatants is a collateral consequence instead of
inextricably part of the direct means of achieving self-defense, which
would make the military action in question illicit. When a military relies
on so-called surgical strikes without sufficient on-the-ground
verification of who is a combatant and who is not, it arguably loses the
opportunity to argue that any non-combatant death is merely a collateral
consequence. In other words, militaries should not be able to escape the
stringency of double-effect distinctions, as seen in the abortion
examples, by deliberately intending to preserve uncertainty.
Putting moral formalism aside, it is difficult to see why a situation
like a medically necessary craniotomy or the case of Angela Carder is,
for practical purposes, any different from the few situations where the
Church deems abortion to meet the discrimination requirement. Putting
moral formalism aside, it is difficult to see why large, foreseen, and
potentially avoidable collateral consequences in war themselves meet
this requirement. If such unforgiving consequences are to be justified by
the discrimination requirement, interpretations of this concept must be
more internally coherent.
III. RECONCILING JUST WAR THEORY AND THE CHURCH'S
CONSISTENT LIFE ETHIC

Given the inconsistencies between the Church's applications of just
war principles and the principles found elsewhere in its life ethic, the
question arises: Can these principles be reconciled, and, if so, how?
That the Church seeks a harmonious life ethic, inclusive of its
applications of just war doctrine, seems evident particularly given how
it organizes its official Catechism on the Fifth Commandment,' 94 as
well as how other Church documents consistently connect doctrine on
one practice to reinforce its doctrine on other practices. 195 Yet, given the
numerous inconsistencies addressed in Part III, it is unclear if and how
such a harmonious life ethic is actually possible.
This Part explores the possibility of reconciling the challenges faced
in applications of just war theory vis-hi-vis the Church's broader life
ethic. Across the topics of just cause, proportionality, and
discrimination, this Part explores several possibilities for better
harmonization. First, the complexities of applying just war principles in
practice might call for an alteration of the Church's broader life ethic,
194.
195.

See Part 1.
Id.
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which might become more permissive with respect to practices that the
Church has heavily restricted. Second, the Church might impose tighter
thresholds for meeting the criteria for just war, in accordance with the
Church's strict treatment of life in other contexts. Third, the Church
might proffer a more comprehensive explanation for why war, given its
nature and purposes, merits the more permissive treatment it appears to
receive compared to other matters where life and death is at stake.
Ultimately, this Part finds that the Church is unlikely to proffer a
plausible explanation for why war should be treated so differently
compared to other issues. Instead, even while the Church is unlikely to
abandon wholly its position on other issues, there may be ways for these
positions and just war theory to converge. Because the Church seeks a
harmonious life ethic, and in order to buttress the moral force of its
principles, it should consider taking steps to reconcile the various
doctrines.
A. Just Cause
The Church does not restrict the just cause of self-defense to
circumstances when human lives are physically at stake, implicitly
allowing the defense of means, was, and qualities of life to qualify as a
sufficiently good justification. 6 Yet, though this position is
inconsistent with the Church's broader position that considerations of
quality of life cannot justify killing, it is all but absolutely certain that
the Church will not alter this broader position. The Church will not
abandon its centuries-long tradition of regarding abortion and
euthanasia as intrinsic evils even when they are based on well-intended
quality of life considerations.' 97 Instead, imposing a more restrictive
understanding of just cause is the more pragmatic, realistic alternative.
This alternative would entail that the Church sanctions war only if truly
existential threats are at hand.
At the same time, though this may be a more realistic alternative,
restricting just cause only to truly existential threats may be equally
problematic. First, the question arises of what precisely counts as an
existential threat. For example, the self-defense rationale traditionally
allows countries to fight against aggressors. Yet, to avoid the spilling of
any blood on either side, one might argue that the aggrieved country
could simply surrender and put up no resistance. Thus, at least a few
might argue that that this scenario does not pose a situation where life
and death were truly at stake. Second, while it has not been pressed on
this issue since the end of the Cold War, the Church seems unlikely to
relinquish its stance that defending way-of-life concepts such as
196. See supra Part I.A.
197. Id.
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religious freedom and independence is a just cause even if through
violence. A counterargument might be found in the context of the
ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. With regards to this conflict, though the
Church invites Christians "to understand this religious attachment [by
Israelis to claimed land] which finds its roots in Biblical tradition," it
states that the "existence of the State of Israel and its political options
should be envisaged not in a perspective which is in itself religious, but
' 98
in their reference to the common principles of international law."'
Nevertheless, where not merely religious land, but a religious lifestyle is
threatened, as in the Spanish Civil War or more broadly with
communism, the Church's history reveals its position more clearly.
A third alternative would be for the Church to make a distinction
between taking life in the name of defending a society's religious
freedom as a way of life, and taking life in cases of abortion and
euthanasia for the sake of not inflicting suffering and an abject quality
of life. Here, the Church also faces difficulties. First, the Church would
naturally argue that religious freedom and the Catholic religion
specifically in general are necessary for human flourishing, while
practices such as abortion and euthanasia are not. However, one might
counter that, rather than taking others' lives to defend one's religion,
resisting non-violently or even sacrificing one's own life for religion
protects religious freedom more strongly. The Church's long tradition
of martyrdom of Catholics without arms, inclusive of those clergy who
were massacred in the Spanish Civil War, supports the idea that such
self-sacrificial behavior reinforces the communal
99 strength of religion,
perhaps even more so than taking up arms does. 1
Second, while one might attempt to stress that one scenario involves
non-innocent aggressors while the other involves innocent human
beings, the Church's doctrine does not actually consider "innocence" in
making distinctions between good or neutral acts and evil acts. What
makes self-defense morally permissible is that one is upholding one's
own life and that the killing of other person-whether guilty or
innocent-is not technically the means of achieving this end, but a
collateral consequence of the immediate action of defending one's own
life.2 °° In other words, it is an issue of discrimination/intent, not just
cause. As underlined in its argument against capital punishment that
even non-innocent individuals have purpose in life and may be able to
reform, the Church does not assume the position that non-innocent and
198.
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innocent individuals have differing moral worth. 20 1 Therefore,
distinguishing between innocent people and non-innocent aggressors
does little to reconcile the problem.
With these difficulties in reconciling principles, what becomes clear
is that the Church must above all address why some forms of corporal,
psychological, or spiritual suffering-but not others-merits the taking
of life. Again, the Church is all but absolutely certain not to change its
position on issues like abortion or euthanasia. Still, it must consider why
the abject pain and suffering that these practices often inflict on other
people is of a kind that people must withstand, even as they need not
withstand suffering arising from the absence of other goods.
While the Catholic Church's doctrine addresses this argument to
some degree, it potentially downplays or mischaracterizes certain
issues. For example, it largely presents pregnant women's concerns for
the well-being of their families and potential child as abstract economic
or demographic concerns, rather than largely a concern that a child
might be subject to sustained, agonizing, and in real practice,
insurmountable indignities through a lifetime. 20 2 Unsurprisingly, some
of the idealistic solutions it offers-for example, a redistribution of
resources to ensure the well-being of pregnant women's families203_
may miss the practical realities of these problems, potentially rendering
many people to suffer while these solutions slowly (or never) take
effect.
Even when the Church most directly addresses these
realities-for example, when it argues that no degree and length of
potential pain justifies abortion or assisted suicide-its argument that
201.
202.
203.

See supra text accompanying note 116.
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
As the Evangelium Vitae states:
The ways of solving the population problem are quite different. Governments
and the various international agencies must above all strive to create economic,
social, public health and cultural conditions which will enable married couples
to make their choices about procreation in full freedom and with genuine
responsibility. They must then make efforts to ensure greater opportunities and
a fairer distribution of wealth so that everyone can share equitably in the goods
of creation. Solutions must be sought on the global level by establishing a true
economy of communion and sharing of goods, in both the national and
international order.

Evangelium Vitae, supra note 1, 91.
204. One example might be adoption. According to some statistics, over 400 million
"abandoned children live on their own on the streets of hundreds of cities around the world.
They subsist hand to mouth. They struggle just to survive the day." Statistics on Abandoned
Children, INTERNATIONAL STREET KiDs, available at http://www.internationalstreetkids.com/
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Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1163, 1166 n.5 (1991).
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pain is an existence that all persons must bear, and even something that
brings meaning to life, is difficult to comprehend "by reason itself' for
the many persons experiencing indignities that shock the conscience
(for example, malnourished children who lack basic human necessities,
20 5
and terminally ill persons who wish to die in a non-traumatic way).
The Church's reverence of life is noble. However, it also
underscores not only classically difficult ethical questions (e.g., is
someone better off living in abject suffering than being killed), but also
new ones emphasized by its views on just cause doctrine in war. As
Pope John Paul II stated in 1982, "people[] have a right and even a duty
to protect their existence and freedom. '2W Why freedom, in addition to
existence? Why is it better to fight to live freely, at the cost of human
lives including potentially one's own, than to live in bondage, at the
cost of no life? That the Church implicitly believes that there are certain
principles beyond life itself that are worth defending requires that they
have a more comprehensive vision for why other principles are
excluded. Only by presenting such a vision can the Church truly
reconcile "just cause" doctrine across its life ethic.
B. Proportionality/LastResort
In contradiction to its rigid position against attempting to make
valuations of life in other areas, the Church sanctions war even when
there is great uncertainty as to whether the benefits to the proffered just
cause doctrine outweigh the cost of human destruction. On the one
hand, given two conflicting realities-that the Church is unlikely to
change its broader life ethic, but that the nature of threats like terrorism
makes speculative calculations all but necessary-it seems unlikely that
either just war doctrine or the Church's broader life ethic can begin to
converge. On the other hand, arguing that war and self-defense
inherently require more permissive standards of conduct than other
contexts is a problematic option as well.
Regarding the argument that war and self-defense require more
permissive standards, the context of war might actually exacerbate,
rather than mitigate the concerns that the Church has elsewhere in its
life ethic. For example, the Church limits speculative valuations of life
in abortion and euthanasia because of the belief that humans are
incapable of making such decisions without exaggerated anxiety and

205. These arguments interact in complex ways with the concepts of consciousness and
autonomy, the former argument potentially justifying abortion versus infanticide (e.g., because
of the importance of present human experience as compared to future potential), and the latter
argument potentially justifying assisted suicide versus infanticide.
206. See John Paul 1I,supra note 80, 12.
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fear. 20 7 Yet these fears are arguably greater precisely when one's own
life and autonomy seem physically and imminently at stake, which is far
less the case when people consider practices like euthanasia. 2' Though
the Church was staunchly opposed to the 2003 Iraq War, this war
209shows
fear.
unfounded
on
based
war
wage
to
capacity
human's
exactly
Where there are even more compelling reasons and evidence to wage
war against terrorism, human beings may ironically continue to be
prone to disproportionate responses, all while the Church sanctions
those responses. Thus, although the nature of security threats like
terrorism may counsel acceptance of a greater degree of uncertainty
than tradition would dictate, the leeway cannot be too great. Otherwise,
doctrine would too greatly enter the territory of the specific ends
justifying the particular means. Just as the Church recognizes the
slippery slope of legitimizing practices like assisted suicide, so it must
recognize the same slippery slope of legitimizing more permissive
practices of war.
Furthermore, any attempt to argue that self-defensive war requires
inherently more permissive standards would somehow have to
distinguish why some abortions such as craniotomies are impermissible
even when a mother is not just speculatively likely, but scientifically
certain to die without this procedure-that is, even when a procedure is
undoubtedly used for self-defense.2 10 Otherwise, significant dissonance
will continue to exist between standards of war, where uncertainty about
self-defensive benefits is insufficient to bar action, and the rest of the
Church's life ethic, where uncertainty about self-defensive benefits
(e.g., that treatment would prolong Angela Carder's
21 life) may be
sufficient to bar action that would harm another person. '
What the Church appears to be left with is to attempt making war
ethic and its broader life ethic converge, at least to some extent. Though
it is certainly difficult to apply such abstract principles as
proportionality, it can no longer be enough for the Church to concede
this point (as the USCCB did in 1982) without making more explicit
distinctions that would guide military actions, particularly in an era of
uncertain threats. Above all, this would involve defining the extent of
good faith effort that military efforts must make to obtain all of the
information they can, to mitigate speculative applications of principles
like proportionality. How much should militaries be able to rely solely
on aerial assaults, whether manned or unmanned? Must militaries risk
207.

See supra Part II.B.

208. See id. (though granted, there are exceptions, what with the history of eugenics
experiments).
209.
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on-the-ground presence in order to gain better intelligence about the
benefits and costs of war? If not what, why is this not a violation of
broader life ethic?
C. Discrimination
In contrast to the Church's generally restrictive stance on the issue of
intent and foresight, it has a much more permissive stance on these
principles with respect to war. Unlike with other inconsistencies, this
tension may have the greatest likelihood of resolution by the Church
altering its broader life ethic, at least to a small extent. With the
ultimately narrow and rare issue of an abortion by craniotomy, for
example, the Church might be willing to recognize that the killing of a
fetus is a collateral consequence, rather than a means in itself, of a selfdefensive end goal.212
The Church might adopt this position particularly considering the
presence of certainty in the grim outcomes of the mother and child
absent performance of the craniotomy procedure. When analyzing these
prongs of the double-effect doctrine, arguably there is little moral
difference between this procedure and a hysterectomy. 2 13 Perhaps what
undergirds the Church's position is that certain procedures are more
brutal and affronting of life than others-but this is true of much of war,
214
a reality that technology often exacerbates instead of ameliorates.
These abortion scenarios are undoubtedly ones where the sef-defense
rationale applies. So, it is difficult to see why a mother cannot claim that
a craniotomy is morally equivalent to a military action that kills
innocent non-combatants only foreseeably. By making small changes to
its broader life ethic, the Church can begin to reconcile the problem
posed by uncertain threats like terrorism to the requirement that military
actions distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.
Despite this potential for moderately altering the Church's positions
to make it more consistent with applications of just war principles, the
Church must still take care to avoid permissive standards for meeting
discrimination in war. On the one hand, it is impractical to require that
military actions be restricted to those where there is a high level of
certainty that innocent civilians will not be killed even unintentionally.
On the other hand, the Church must still address the extent to which
military leaders have a responsibility to lessen uncertainty about
potential harm to combatants and non-combatants. Just as objective
certainty, and not an individual's subjective intent, matters in the
scenario of deciding whether to remove medical care from a person in a
212.
213.
214.

Cf Nicholson, supranote 164, at 388.
Cf id.
See supra Part II.B.
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persistent vegetative state, so the Church must be careful to let
unmitigated uncertainty about combatants and non-combatants allow
military actions to escape the discrimination requirement. Therefore,
even while the Church might loosen intent requirements in other area of
its doctrine, it should simultaneously consider requiring military actions
to meet a high threshold for meeting discrimination. From a practical
standpoint, this might require military actors to take more action on the
ground, despite its risks, before conducting aerial assaults. Such a
potential moral requirement is particularly crucial when manned aerial
assaults morph more and more into unmanned assaults, as they appear
to be doing, further removing the military from non-combatants on the
ground.
Even more than the principles of just cause doctrine and
proportionality, the principle of discrimination demonstrates the chasm
between the just war doctrine of the Church and the rest of its consistent
life ethic. In this realm, the end result of its moral formalism entails that
even some mothers with the most compelling of legitimate self-defense
claims must die, along with their fetuses. Meanwhile, militaries can take
scores of civilian life in incident after subsequent incident with moral
immunity, as they appeared to do in the opening salvos of Afghanistan.
Such inconsistencies pose the greatest challenge to the Church's claims
that its doctrine on life is not merely justified by faith, but knowable by
reason, entailing that even those who do not subscribe to Catholic faith
should reach the same moral conclusions. These inconsistencies also
fuel popular criticism about extensive focus on issues like abortion by
Christians, compared to somewhat less importance on other similarly
life-and-death issues. 215 Ultimately, it is understandable that the Church
must draw moral and ethical lines somewhere, even strong ones.
However, where those lines are inconsistent with one another, a
purportedly consistent life ethic loses much of its moral force - and
consequently its public support.
CONCLUSION

For whatever inconsistencies might exist between the Church's
applications of just war doctrine and its consistent life ethic, the Church
still arguably has a restrictive view of war. Indeed, some have criticized
the Catholic Church's position on post-Cold War just war theory as
being too restrictive. George Weigel argues, for example, that the
Church's restrictive default position has been on display since
215. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Why I am Pro-Life, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2012),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/28/opinion/sunday/friedman-why-i-am-prolife.html.
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September 11, criticizing the Church (despite its support for military
action in Afghanistan) for its warnings about "violence begetting
violence - as if a proportionate and discriminate use of military force in
a just case were the moral equivalent of turning a plane into a weapon
of mass destruction." 2 16 In this statement, Weigel propounds a much
broader reading
of proportionality and discrimination than the Church
21
itself would.

W

Despite this criticism, however, the Church's applications of just war
are actually not restrictive enough when they are compared to the
entirety of the Church's life ethic. On the one hand, Pope John Paul II
might especially be lauded for restricting the moral permissiveness of
war in certain instances. On the other hand, any shift must be evaluated
in light of the fact that he also restricted the permissiveness of other
actions, like abortion, assisted suicide, and capital punishment. For
whatever shift occurred with respect to just war, the shifts in the other
aspects of Catholic life doctrine went much further, as encapsulated in
the landmark Evangelium Vitae.
No matter how precisely the Church chooses to re-conceptualize its
life ethic, there will likely have to be two broad steps. First, it must
articulate more clearly its just war policies ex ante. Particularly in an
age of changing technology, it is no longer sufficient for the Church
merely to concede that it is difficult to apply certain principles like
proportionality; make statements in ostensibly tentative support for
military action without specifically explaining its reasoning; then bring
the full force of Vatican or USCCB condemnation only ex post. Such is
not the path the Church takes with respect to other issues, like abortion.
So it should not be the path it takes with actions that even more people
agree are an afront to human life.
Second, the Church must give greater consideration as to the
counterarguments to its positions on issues concerning the rest of its life
ethic. As exploration of these issues shows, even the most restrictive
positions on life are qualified and narrowed by concepts like intent and
innocence. These concepts certainly are morally relevant. However, the
Church must give deeper and more explicit consideration as why other
concepts, such as stage of life, consciousness, suffering, or dignity are
not-particularly since the Church emphasizes that illicitness of acts
like abortion are not only "contrary to the Law of God," but also
somehow "knowable by reason itself., 218 In succinct terms, the answer
to the question of why suffering exists, already eluding generations of
philosophers and public intellectuals, is a question only complicated by
216. George Weigel, The Just War Tradition and the World After September 11, 51 CATH.
U. L. REv. 689, 694 (2002).
217. Id.
218. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 1, 62. (emphasis added).
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these issues.
This Article has attempted to illuminate problems with the Catholic
Church's applications of just war theory and its broader life ethic. It
finds that, while the Church's reverence for the sanctity of life places it
in a unique and noble category of mainstream organizations, this
reverence is threatened by these problems of inconsistency. By
identifying these problems, this Article goes beyond existing
scholarship, which has often identified problems with the Church's just
war applications, but not vis-ti-vis broader life ethic that can
simultaneously illuminate-and constrain-these applications. While
there are many different ways to reconcile these positions, some are less
viable and helpful than others. In any case, particularly as the world has
entered a world with uncertain threats, it is clear that the Church must
give greater reflection to these issues.
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